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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

indicate that some portion, at least, of the refreshing material was
prepared by the witness in his own words and was available to
defendant under our prior decisions. 21
In summary, it clearly appears that under the Illinois adoption of the
Federal rule, as clarified in Scott, the defendant in a criminal prosecution
may have access to a testifying witness's prior statements which are in the
hands of the prosecution. That is true regardless of whether the statements
22
are used in refreshing memory while on the stand or not.

R.

HANKIN

To REPeople v. Monroe, 43 Ill. App. 2d 1, 192 N.E.2d 691
(2d Dist. 1963), the Appellate Court of Illinois was confronted with the
question of whether the presumption of legitimacy of a child conceived
during wedlock was overcome by the wife's testimony that she had no intercourse with her husband during the possible period of conception. In the
trial court, the jury found that the evidence presented by the wife was
sufficient to rebut the presumption and that the defendant paramour was
the father of her child. On appeal, the defendant contended that the prePATERNITY1-PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY-PROOF NECESSARY

BUT

PRESUMPTION-In

21 People v. Scott, 29 Ill. 2d 97, 193 N.E.2d 814, 821 (1963).
22 Interestingly, it is equally apparent that the United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit, feels the traditional view should prevail in civil litigation; that no absolute right exists in the examining party to demand inspection of a writing not used by
the testifying witness in refreshing his memory on the stand. In Goldman v. Checker Cab
Co., 325 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1963), decided since the Scott decision, the plaintiff brought
an action for alleged injuries sustained while a passenger in the defendant's taxi which
was allegedly struck from the rear by another of the defendant's vehicles. The Court held
that the trial court erroneously quashed the deposition of the plaintiff's physician who had
treated the plaintiff from the date of the accident to the trial. The osteopath, testifying
in his office from memory alone, refused the defendant's demand that he produce his
records of the treatment of the plaintiff. For that reason, the trial court quashed he deposition. In reviewing the transpirings below, the Court of Appeals cited Echert, but made
no mention of Jencks. Justice Kiley, speaking for the Court said: "Since the doctor testified from memory alone, defendant was not entiled to have the records produced at the
taking of the deposition. Echert v. United States ....
The opportunity given by the district
court to bring the doctor from Missouri with his records did not cure the error. . . . If
defendant wishes to obtain Dr. Gould's records, it has the opportunity to do .so by appropriate procedures on remand."
An interesting question which arises inferentially in Goldman v. Checker Cab Co. is
whether the decision limits the discretion of the trial court, previously considered part
and parcel of the traditional view. The question may be answered when it is remembered
that since the witness's testimony was under deposition, the trial court acutally had no
discretion to compel inspection. Therefore, since there is no absolute right under the traditional view to inspect, no reason then existed to quash the deposition, especially in
view of Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 45(b), which provides: "For Production of Documentary
Evidence. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce
the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein.
1 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 106 3/4 (1963).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

sumption of legitimacy had not been rebutted since the principal factor in
the plaintiff's evidence was her own self-serving testimony that she had not
copulated with her husband at or around the period of conception. The
Appellate Court agreed with the putative father and reversed the trial
court's judgment.
The plaintiff was a married woman at the time the child in question
was conceived in June, 1959, but was divorced from her husband on January 19, 1960; the child was born out of wedlock on March 10, 1960. The
evidence produced at the trial indicated that the plaintiff and defendant
had been carrying on an illicit clandestine affair at the time the child was
conceived. Both plaintiff and defendant had engaged in discussions with a
doctor about the expectant child. The other five children of the plaintiff
and her husband were dark complected, with dark eyes and dark hair like
their father, who was Spanish. However, the child in question had a very
fair complexion, blue eyes and light blond hair. The wife testified that
although she lived in the same house with her husband, she had not slept
in the same bed or bedroom with him since 1955, and they did not speak
to each other. This was verified by a son. On direct examination, she testified that she had had intercourse with her husband once since meeting the
defendant and to the best of her knowledge that was in 1957. On cross examination, however, she testified that she had intercourse with her husband
one time while living with him in the same house from 1957 to 1960. There
was evidence that the plaintiff and defendant were on a one week vacation
together about the 1st of June, 1959, the period during which the child
was likely conceived. The defendant denied he had ever had sexual relations
with the plaintiff and testified that he was on a fishing trip by himself about
the 1st of June, 1959, but could not recall the names of any motels where
he had sojourned.
Although the presumption of legitimacy arising from birth in wedlock
was once considered practically conclusive in England, the majority of the
courts in the United States now hold that the presumption is rebuttable, 2
but differ as to the nature of the evidence necessary to overcome the presumption. The Illinois courts have stated that the presumption is overcome
by proof that the husband was impotent or that he had no possibility of
access to the wife at the time of conception. 3 The degree of proof necessary
to rebut the presumption of legitimacy in Illinois has been variously stated
2 Re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930); Wilson v. Wilson, 174 Ky. 771, 193
S.W. 7 (1917); Arthur v. Arthur, 262 Ala. 126, 77 So. 2d 477 (1955).
3 In People v. Gleason, 211 Ill. App. 380 (1st Dist. 1918), the presumption of legitimacy was overcome where it was shown that the wife did not meet her husband until
August, 1917; married him on December 3, 1917; and the child was born on December 8,
1917; whereas she had been having sexual relations with the defendant from June, 1916
to June, 1917. Also, in Robinson v. Ruprecht, 191 Ill. 424, 61 N.E. 631 (1901), the presumption failed even though the legal husband was living in the same state as the wife,
but had no access to her and both the wife and the paramour were not aware of the
husband's residence.
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as "clear and conclusive,"4 "dear and convincing," 5 and "clear and irre7
fragable." 6 The burden of proof is upon the person alleging illegitimacy
and the presumption cannot be "shaken by a mere balance of probabilities. ' 8 The husband is presumed to be the father of a child conceived during coverture even if the marriage is terminated prior to birth, unless it can
be shown that the husband did not cohabit with the wife at the time she
became pregnant.9
At common law both the husband and wife were considered incompetent to testify to the husband's nonaccess to the wife, where such testimony would tend to bastardize or prove a child conceived after marriage
illegitimate. 10 The reason often given for holding the wife incompetent to
testify to the access or nonaccess of the husband is one of "public decency
and morality."1 However, a wife may give evidence of illicit relations with
other men on the grounds that this information could not otherwise be
12
obtained because of the secrecy which necessarily surrounds such relations.
Therefore, if the wife may testify to the lurid details of an extra-marital
affair in open court, there would seem to be no reason to shelter the public
from her testimony regarding intimacies (or lack thereof) with her husband.
Nevertheless, the wife's incompetency to testify to her husband's nonaccess
still persists in many states unless abrogated by statute. The reason for this
inconsistency is that the courts are not so much interested in protecting the
"public decency and morality" as they are in sheltering the child from the
stigma of illegitimacy.
An early Illinois Appellate case' 8 followed the common law rule in
stating that the mother could not deny the presumption of legitimacy,
where the child is born in wedlock, for reasons of public decency and morality. However, this same court said:
S .* .

This prohibition does not apply to her competency as a

witness, but is a rule of law governing any right of action which
she may set up, 14
involving such bastardism of her own offspring,
born in wedlock.
The Illinois Supreme Court has held, in reviewing a bastardy proceeding,
that the husband is incompetent to testify as to the nonaccess to the wife,
Sugrue v. Crilley, 329 II. 458, 160 N.E. 847 (1928).
Dill v. Patterson, 326 Ill. App. 511, 62 N.E.2d 249 (4th Dist. 1945).
Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 Ill. 554, 21 N.E. 430 (1889).
7 Zachmann v. Zachmann, 201 Ill. 380, 66 N.E. 256 (1903).
8 Orthwein v. Thomas, supra note 6.
9 Drennan v. Douglas, 102 I11. 341, 40 A.R. 595 (1882). Also, see Zachmann v. Zachmann, supra note 7, wherein a child born 20 days after the mother divorced husband #1
and 15 days after her marriage to husband #2 was considered to be the child of husband #2.
10 Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 594, 98 Eng. Rep. 1258 (1777).
11 Rex v. Rook, 1 Wils. 340, 95 Eng. Rep. 651 (1752).
12 Rex. v. Reading, 95 Eng. Rep. 49 (1734).
13 Vetten v. Wallace, 39 Ill. App. 390 (4th Dist. 1890).
14 Id. at 397.
4
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but she is given the "unqualified right to testify." After discussing the law
of England, Justice Heard said:
* .*.

.

In

this country in earlier times there was much diversity

of opinion as to the competency of the wife. There does not seem
to have been any as to the incompetency of the husband. This led
to the enactment of statutes on the subject in many States, while
in some the old English law still prevails. In this state under the
early statutes the question could never arise as only unmarried
women were given the benefit of those statutes. In 1919, the word
'unmarried' was elided from the Bastardy act and married women
were given the benefit of the act. By this act the prosecutrix is specifically given the unqualified right to testify.' 5

Today, Illinois still has the same statutory provision, although it has been
renamed the "Paternity Act," which declares the mother and the accused
in a paternity action to be competent witnesses and their credibility to be
left to the jury. 16
In the instant case, 17 the Appellate Court, Second District, in reversing the lower court, held, as a matter of law, that the presumption of legitimacy had not been overcome by the wife's testimony that she had not had
intercourse with her husband during the period in which conception likely
occurred. The court, without definitely indicating whether it was objecting
to the wife's competency or to her credibility, stated:
....
Her [plaintiff's] case was based primarily upon her own testimony of no intercourse and our courts have held that a wife will
not be allowed to make such a statement as long as she is living
with her husband.' 8
It is difficult to rationalize the Appellate Court's opinion in the light of
the Illinois Supreme Court's pronouncement that the mother has an "unqualified right to testify" and the legislative mandate that the credibility
of her testimony is to be left to the jury. It would seem that an unwarranted
restriction is being placed upon the wife's testimony.
In Illinois, a paternity action is a civil proceeding and it is only necessary to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is the
father of the child. However, to overcome the presumption of legitimacy
of a child conceived in wedlock and born within a competent time thereafter, the proof must be "clear and irrefragable." The instant case creates
the anomalous situation whereby the jury may find the defendant to be the
father of the plaintiff's child, but nevertheless must find upon the same
evidence that the plaintiff's child is legitimate. It is difficult to imagine a
paternity action where a mother would be able to produce more convincing evidence than was presented in People v. Monroe.
15 People v. Dile, 347 Il. 23, 27, 179 N.E. 93, 95 (1931).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 106 3/4, sec. 56 (1963).
17 People v. Monroe, 43 Il. 2d 1, 192 N.E.2d 691. (2d Dist. 1963).
18 Id. at 8, 192 N.E.2d at 694.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

The best method to eliminate this seemingly unconquerable barrier of
the presumption of legitimacy, where the mother is married, would seem
to be by the use of blood tests, whenever possible, showing that her husband
was not the father of her child. 19 If the mother could eliminate the presumption of legitimacy by excluding her husband from any possibility of
being assumed to be the father, then she could obtain a favorable adjudication in her paternity action by proving the defendant to be the father of
her child by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Of course, the court
may always order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood
tests; but the results of such tests are admissible in court only to exclude the
defendant as being the father of the child and never as affirmative proof of
20
guilt.
T. RYDELL

TORTS-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-LIABILITY OF ROPE MANUFACTURER-A

recent decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois in May v. Columbian
Rope' serves to underscore the longevity and progression of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.
The case arose out of an accident that occurred at a construction site
when a one-half inch, three-strand Manila line, manufactured by Columbian, broke and caused the plaintiff to fall and sustain injuries. The
evidence presented by the plaintiff was entirely circumstantial, consisting of the offending rope and the plaintiff's own testimony that on the
morning of the accident the rope was "brand new," having been delivered
to the job and placed in use only some 45 minutes before it broke. This
testimony was seemingly corroborated by the deposition of a fellow workman, and by the direct testimony of the man who delivered the rope to the
rope apjob site. A further point made by the delivery man was that the
2
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To rebut the inference of negligence arising from the circumstantial evidence put forward by the plaintiff, the defendant, Columbian,
introduced extensive evidence pertaining to its manufacturing processes,
arguing that its testing and safety procedures "showed it to be in the
exercise of all due care in the manufacture of its rope.8 This evidence
was buttressed by the testimony of an expert witness that the "dirty" rope
in question was not new, as the plaintiff had testified. In concluding its
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 106 3/4, § 5.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 106 3/4, § 1.
1 40 Ill. App. 2d 264, 189 N.E.2d 394 (1st Dist. 1963).
2 Id. at 279, 189 N.E.2d at 400. The court took notice of the fact that the workman
giving the deposition freely admitted that an illness had left him with an impaired memory and capacity for narration and that he was "hazy" about such events which had happened long ago.
3 Id. at 269, 189 N.E.2d at 396.

